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Abstract:   
This paper brings new evidence on the impact of The Peruvian Job Youth Training 
Program (Projoven). Compared with prior evaluations of the program, this one has 
several advantages. This is the first experimental impact evaluation of Projoven, and also 
the first to measure impacts over a longer period: almost three years after training. 
Additionally, the evaluation supplements data from a follow-up survey with 
administrative data from the country’s Electronic Payroll (Planilla Electrónica), allowing 
for a more accurate measure of formal employment. It also measures whether socio-
emotional skills of beneficiaries improved with program participation. The evaluation 
finds a high long term positive impact of Projoven on formal employment. It also finds 
certain heterogeneity of program impacts across subpopulations. Impacts on formal 
employment vary depending on the beneficiaries’ gender and age, with different patterns 
of statistical significance depending on the data source used to measure employment 
formality. Finally, it does not find significant impacts on socio-emotional skills.  
Keywords: Long-term, impact evaluation, Randomized Controlled Trial, Peru, youth 
training, labor market outcomes.  
  
JEL Classification: J24, J64, O15, O17. 
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Introduction 
 
Most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are affected by high levels of youth 
unemployment and/or labor informality (IDB, 2013). In the case of Peru, informality is 
the most serious of these problems. Around 9% of youths between 15 and 24 years of age 
are unemployed, and 80% of youths who are employed have informal jobs.
1
  
 
To improve the labor market conditions of young people, governments in the region are 
implementing diverse Active Labor Market Policies. These policies aim to achieve short-
term labor insertion or reemployment of unemployed workers or vulnerable people whose 
job placement is difficult (IDB, 2013). Short training programs are the most common 
active policy in the region. In general, they operate in urban areas and are geared towards 
the most vulnerable or underprivileged youths (Ibarrarán and Rosas, 2009). In addition, 
these programs seek to increase the human capital of their beneficiaries as a key 
mechanism for fast insertion into the formal labor market. Toward this end, they offer 
short-term technical training courses and formal work experience (through internships). 
Rigorous impact evaluations available for some of these programs reveal that, in the short 
term, this type of program does not improve beneficiaries’ chances of obtaining a job, but 
it does increase the probability of getting a formal job, i.e. a higher quality job (González, 
Ripani, and Rosas, 2012). Given the programs’ characteristics and the high levels of 
informality involved, especially in the case of the young population they target, this result 
is worth highlighting. On the other hand, evaluations of vocational training programs 
indicate that the impact of these programs tends to increase with time (Card et al., 2010), 
hence the importance of measuring their impact beyond the short term (two years).  
 
The Peruvian Job Youth Training Program (Projoven), implemented between 1996 and 
2010, was one of these programs. Previous evaluations of Projoven find positive and 
significant impact of the program in terms of employment and income. Nevertheless, 
these results must be interpreted with care, since the evaluations reveal methodological 
limitations that may bias their results.  
 
This study seeks to correct the main limitations of previous evaluations of the program, 
and to introduce new evidence on the impact of Projoven.
2
 The evaluation covers the 
period from the program’s last public call for applications in 2009-2010 to the follow-up 
survey conducted in 2013. This term corresponds to a period of economic growth and an 
expansion of registered employment (formal employment) in the country. Rates of 
average annual economic growth and registered employment growth (formal 
employment) were 6% and 7%, respectively. However, a more detailed analysis 
demonstrates that these indicators started progressively slowing down around 2012.  
                                                          
1 
Labor figures were extracted from the SIMS-LMK database of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
which is based on national households surveys. Informality is calculated according to the number of 
contributors or affiliates to the social security system, over the total number of wage-earners. Since wage-
earners are involved, this definition of informality is mainly urban.  
2
The evaluation would not have been possible without the support of Peru’s Ministry of Labor and Job 
Promotion (MTPE). 
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Compared with prior evaluations of the program, this one has several advantages. First, 
this is the first evaluation of Projoven that uses an experimental methodology to measure 
the program’s impacts. Second, impact measurements are not short-term, since they were 
performed almost three years after beneficiaries left the program. Previous evaluations 
measured the program’s impact after 6, 12, or 18 months. Third, this is the first 
evaluation of the program that combines data from a follow-up survey with 
administrative data from the Electronic Payroll (Planilla Electrónica), a registry with 
monthly reports of employment from formal employers with more than two workers. The 
Electronic Payroll registry makes it possible to measure formal employment directly, 
while employment surveys rely on self-reporting. Last, this is also the first evaluation 
aimed at measuring whether the program improves beneficiaries’ socio-emotional skills, 
such as motivation and self-esteem. These skills are considered key for professional 
development and are valued by companies (González, Ripani, and Rosas, 2012). 
 
In line with evidence from impact evaluations of similar programs in the region, this 
evaluation finds a positive impact of Projoven on formal employment. This impact is 
very high, reaching 20% according to data from the follow-up survey, and 17% according 
to data from the Electronic Payroll. When analyzing these figures, the very low levels of 
formality, for both the control and treatment groups, need to be taken into consideration. 
For instance, according to the follow-up survey, only 15% of youths from the control 
group hold formal employment. Another interesting result is that impact is only observed 
for the year 2013. As mentioned above, that year was characterized by a slowdown in the 
economic growth rate and registered employment. Thus, the result may indicate that, 
compared with the control group, the program did not succeed in improving young 
beneficiaries chances of finding low-qualification formal jobs in times when the economy 
was generating relatively higher levels of registered employment (which was the case 
from 2010 to 2012). However, it was able to do so during a period when there were fewer 
opportunities, in general, of finding a formal job. Another explanation might be that the 
program’s impact tends to increase over time, given that when compared with individuals 
in the control group, beneficiaries must make up the time they spent in the program (lock-
in-effect).  
 
On the other hand, certain heterogeneity is observed in the program’s impact, since there 
are impact variations on formal employment depending on the beneficiaries’ gender and 
age, but the statistical significance of the impact varies depending on the sample used to 
perform the estimates. When considering the results of the follow-up survey, significant 
impacts are observed for almost 40% of men, and also for youths under 18. However, 
although results comparable in sign and magnitude are observed when using data from 
the Electronic Payroll, which captures the most formal employment in the economy, 
these results are no longer statistically significant. In contrast, statistically significant 
impacts of 26% and 35%, respectively, are obtained for women and youths older than 18. 
These differences in the estimates, depending on the source of information, may be 
related to limitations in terms of the size of disaggregated samples used for the estimates. 
They may also be related to other factors that require a more thorough analysis.  
 
5 
 
This document is organized in five sections. The first section introduces the background 
on Projoven and its main characteristics. The second section describes the existing 
evidence on impact evaluations of similar programs, and evidence from previous 
evaluations of the Projoven program. The third section explains the evaluation design as 
well as the data and methodology used. The fourth section introduces and analyzes the 
results of the evaluation. Finally, the fifth section presents the conclusions.  
 
 
I. Background and Main Features of Projoven3 
 
Projoven was created by the Ministry of Labor and Job Promotion (MTPE) in 1996, and 
was operational until 2010.
4
 Its main objective was to facilitate access into the formal 
labor market for young people with limited resources, providing them with short-term 
training and labor market experience related to the needs of the productive sector—in 
other words, training oriented towards demand. Its design was based on a Chilean 
training program (ChileJoven) that was replicated in several Latin American countries 
(Ibarrarán and Rosas, 2009). The cost of the program per beneficiary (including operating 
costs and a stipend) was relatively low, around US$420.  
 
Projoven offered in-classroom technical training for three months, later to be 
complemented with an internship for three additional months. The program did not 
directly provided in-classroom training, but hired private or public training agencies 
(PPTAs) that were responsible for the design and the provision of training for the 
program’s beneficiaries. PPTAs courses were designed in coordination with firms in 
which beneficiaries would later do their internships. Firms committed to open internship 
vacancies for beneficiaries after they have completed the 3-month in-classroom training. 
In order to participate in the program the PPTAs had to submit letters of commitment 
they had signed with the different firms that would offer internships.  
 
Young people who wished to participate in the program had to come in person to one of 
Projoven’s official registration centers, where they filled out a personal information and 
socio-economic form in order to determine if they qualified to receive program’s benefits 
and comprise the eligible pool.
5
 Those who qualified had to choose their preferred course 
                                                          
3
 The IDB loan document of Projoven presents more detailed information of the program: 
http://www.iadb.org/Document.cfm?id=420244. Also, see Gonzalez, Ripani and Rosas (2012) for a 
comparative analysis of Projoven and other similar training programs in Latin America.  
4
 During its first period, between 1996 and 2004, the program was financed with resources from the Public 
Treasury (Call for Applications 1-12). Afterwards, during the 2005-2010 period, its implementation (Call 
for Applications 13-16) was financed with resources received through a loan from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB). In total, during almost 15 years of service, the program trained approximately 
73,000 youths. In 2010, after a change of government and the end of financing from the IDB, the MTPE 
decided to modify the program’s design and name, becoming “Jóvenes a la Obra.” 
5
 In order to determine eligibility, ie. if the candidates fulfilled the poverty/vulnerability conditions to enter the 
program. Projoven used a proxy means test to this end, based on a score constructed using observable socio-
economic characteristics collected in the personal and socio-economic form. 
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from the list of training courses offered by PPTAs.
6
 Once they selected a course, 
beneficiaries were sent to the corresponding PPTAs to pass a selection process. PPTAs’ 
selection was usually based on vocational and basic skill tests as well as on interviews. 
This selection process at the PPTAs determined which eligible candidates were suitable 
for participation, and thus would get placed in a course, becoming Projoven’s group of 
beneficiaries. Each PPTA was able to use its own procedures and criteria to assess the 
candidates and declare them suitable or unsuitable. This process took place until enough 
young people were assessed and declared suitable to cover the number of available 
openings for each course. Young people deemed unsuitable were given the opportunity to 
make a second choice or even a third choice of a training course. This process could be 
extended until applicants had reached their third choice of a training course, or otherwise 
until all PPTAs had filled their available vacancies. 
 
Selected candidates moved on to the in-classroom technical training stage at a PPTA. The 
training courses were designed to provide the program’s beneficiaries with low-skills 
required in marketplace jobs. For instance: knitting, sales support, and bakery. Unlike 
other programs in the region, Projoven did not require PPTAs to include modules on 
socio-emotional skills, such as motivation or self-esteem, in their training courses.
7
 At the 
end of the course stage, beneficiaries moved on to on-site internships at firms. During the 
3-month internship stage, beneficiaries received a stipend lower than the minimum wage 
as well as health insurance coverage. Both the stipend and the health insurance were 
afforded by the firms, since employment of interns had to be made through the Peruvian 
legal framework of vocational training agreements (a special type of contract between 
employers and interns).  
 
The model used by Projoven and other similar programs in the region was designed to 
increase the human capital of underprivileged youths as a means to rapidly improve their 
chances of labor market insertion. By “human capital” we refer to skills (technical, 
cognitive, and/or socio-emotional) that can be improved through vocational training. This 
term also encompasses on-the-job training through internships in a formal firm. The logic 
behind Projoven rested on the observation that underprivileged young people ended their 
basic education without the required skills and/or lacked the experience or training 
required to obtain a formal job. Therefore, it was expected that the enhancing of their 
human capital would translate into easier access to their first formal job experience. This 
very first formal job experience, despite its short duration, could be equally or even more 
important than the skills learned during in-classroom training, since it would make it 
possible for young people to discover the benefits of formality and would motivate them 
to keep improving their skills in order to stay employed at a formal firm.  
                                                          
6
 Youths who were not able to find courses they were interested in, or courses that met their expectations, had 
the possibility to reapply in the next call for applications, with a waiver for the qualification process. 
According to the program’s administrative information, the percentage of youths who returned to Projoven 
after dropping out from the application process varies between 2% and 3%.  
7
 The importance of these skills (perseverance, self-esteem, teamwork, etc.) for work performance is 
increasingly recognized in the academic literature. For instance, see Heckman et al. (2006) and Bassi et al. 
(2012). For a discussion on this subject, see also González, Ripani, and Rosas (2012). In general, there is 
little evidence for the region (Calero et al., 2013).  
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Another mechanism through which this type of training programs could improve their 
beneficiaries’ labor insertion rates is the information (signals) provided to the productive 
sector about the beneficiaries. Specifically, by conducting a selection process and 
offering a first formal work experience, these programs would certify that their 
beneficiaries were suitable for the formal work environment.  
 
The evaluation was designed to measure Projoven’s degree of success in improving labor 
market insertion for its beneficiaries, both in terms of employment levels and of the 
quality of this employment. Also, although Projoven did not formally offer courses 
focused on improving the socio-emotional skills of its beneficiaries, the evaluation study 
assessed whether the program improved this type of skills. These outcomes are 
considered because qualitative evidence from González, Ripani, and Rosas (2012) 
suggested that some PPTAs offered this type of courses, since they were regarded 
essential for the success of their training process and for reducing drop-outs.  
 
It is worth mentioning that given these programs’ characteristics, their success depends 
on their operation in periods, and/or sectors, and/or geographical areas where formal 
(low-skilled) employment is generated, and also on the credibility and good standing of 
the programs in the productive sector. 
 
 
II. Evidence on the Impact of Youth Job Training Programs, and previous 
studies on Projoven 
 
The economics literature on the short-term impact of vocational training programs in 
developed countries is vast. There is great heterogeneity in the effects observed, and it 
varies depending on the characteristics of participants and type of training.
8
 Regarding 
vocational training programs for young people, they are generally observed to have a 
lower impact than programs for adults (Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar, 2004; Card et al., 
2010; Kluve, 2010). There is less evidence regarding their long-term impact and 
conclusive results cannot be obtained (see, for example, Fitzenbergery et al., 2006; 
Schochet et al., 2008).  
 
Experimental evidence on the impact of youth training programs in Latin America has 
been increasing during the last 15 years. Most of the existing evaluations measure the 
program’s impact in the short term, i.e., less than two years after beneficiaries finished 
the program. These evaluations
9
 present much more encouraging results than those from 
developed countries. In general, youth training programs in Latin America do not have an 
impact in terms of employment, but they do in terms of employment quality, i.e. the 
possibility of finding a formal job (with employment contract and/or medical insurance 
                                                          
8
 See, for instance, Heckman et al. (1999); Dar and Tzannatos (1999); and Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar (2004).  
9
 See for instance the evaluation of similar programs in Dominican Republic (Card et al., 2011; Ibarrarán et al., 
2014); Colombia (Attanasio, Kugler, and Meghir, 2011); Brazil (Calero et al., 2015); and Argentina (Alzúa, 
Cruces, and López, 2013).  
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and a retirement pension), and in terms of labor-based income (Ibarrarán and Rosas, 
2009). Furthermore, there is great heterogeneity in the results, according to beneficiary 
type (for example, men vs. women) and where the programs were implemented (for 
example, capital city vs. other cities). Additionally, some of these evaluations analyze if 
the programs improve the socio-emotional skills of their beneficiaries, but do not obtain 
conclusive results (Ibarrarán et al., 2012; Calero et al., 2013). Recently Ibarrarán et al. 
(2015) presented results for the first long-term impact evaluation of this type of 
programs. The authors evaluated the impact of a youth training program in Dominican 
Republic after six years of participation and found impacts on the quality of employment, 
suggesting that the effect of the program in employment formality is maintained through 
time.  
 
In the case of Projoven several previous evaluations find statistically significant impacts 
on employment rates, quality of employment, and monthly income of beneficiaries (Díaz 
and Jaramillo, 2006). These results can be explained because all of the evaluations are of 
a non-experimental nature and are not able to adequately correct two potential sources of 
selection bias. First, the control group includes young neighbors of beneficiaries of the 
program who did not apply to Projoven, but who had similar (identifiable) socio-
economic characteristics. The fact that these individuals were not seeking to participate in 
Projoven may induce a selection bias in a non-experimental context due to possible self-
selection of program participants based on unobservable characteristics to the evaluator. 
For instance, there are systematic differences regarding the benefits that beneficiaries 
could expect to obtain from the program, or differences in non-observable opportunity 
costs that may explain the differences between the beneficiaries and a non-experimental 
control group.  
 
Second, there may also be a selection bias, given that the final selection of beneficiaries 
accepted into the training courses relied on the evaluation criteria used by PPTAs. In fact, 
the selection of beneficiaries was based on criteria that the evaluator did not observe, thus 
generating a potential source of selection on unobservables. Given that individuals in the 
group of eligible candidates (qualified applicants) are homogenous throughout various 
observable dimensions, and that PPTAs were not authorized to use gender, race or 
general characteristics to conduct selection, the group of beneficiaries could be 
systematically different in some other characteristics from the group of applicants who 
were not admitted. Specifically, PPTAs had incentives to choose the best candidates from 
the pool of eligible youths, due to monetary penalties that apply in case their trainees 
were not able to complete the in-classroom training stage or when they were not able to 
reach the on-the-job-training stage. For example, during their processes of selection, 
PPTAs could use proxies for soft skills or socio-emotional skills like the applicant’s 
9 
 
motivation and punctuality.
10
 As long as these features were related to the individual’s 
performance, beneficiaries could be systematically different from non-beneficiaries.
11
  
 
Consequently, previous evaluations of Projoven do not guarantee that the true effects of 
the program can be identified without bias. This would explain the existence of great 
variability in the results among the different studies. For instance, impacts on labor 
earnings six months after the end of the program  range from 12% to 100%.
12
 
Additionally, none of these evaluations are focused on Projoven’s potential effect on the 
beneficiaries’ socio-emotional skills.  
 
Lastly, these evaluations only measure the impact of the program 6, 12 and/or 18 months 
after participants left. Thus, there is no measurement over a longer period of time or long-
term, a limiting factor since the impact may vary with time (Card et al., 2010).  
 
 
III. Evaluation Design, Period of Evaluation, Methodology and Data 
 
1. Evaluation Design 
 
To avoid problems that may have affected the results of previous evaluations of the 
program, this evaluation introduces several innovations, including the adoption of an 
experimental evaluation design. It was possible to implement this design because 
Projoven had an excess of demand; there were more young people applying to the 
program than the number of available vacancies the PPTAs were able to serve.
13
 Another 
characteristic of the evaluation is that the random allocation had to be done based on the 
group of applicants who had already been declared suitable by PPTAs. In other words, 
these youths had already gone through the process of qualification, course selection, and 
evaluation by a PPTA. This should have reduced the risk of potential self-selection biases 
                                                          
10
As mentioned above, Projoven did not require that PPTAs include modules for socio-emotional skills in their 
courses. Nevertheless, some PPTAs provided workshops to improve these skills during the in-classroom 
training stage, since they were considered crucial for the success of the technical training process, and in 
order to reduce drop-out levels (González, Ripani, and Rosas, 2012). This may be an indication of the 
existence of the bias mentioned above, since PPTAs were aware of the market value of these skills.  
11 The importance of these potential sources of selection bias in non-observable characteristics must not be 
minimized. As shown by Ñopo et al. (2002) and Díaz and Jaramillo (2006), Projoven beneficiaries show 
the so-called “Ashenfelter’s dip” in labor participation and income: both the employment rate and average 
income levels decrease during the months before their participation in the program, which does not happen 
among youths from the control group in data from previous evaluations of Projoven. This is likely to occur 
due to features that make these two groups different, but that the evaluator is not able to observe in the data. 
12
 Longitudinal methods, which use information extracted from various time-points, may help to reduce the 
selection bias under the presumption that systematic discrepancy factors among the beneficiary and 
comparison groups are invariable in time. In particular, Díaz and Jaramillo (2006) demonstrate that 
comparisons between longitudinal and transversal methods generate great differences in estimating the 
impacts of the program. 
13
 For the 16
th
 call for applications, the program originally had less than 10,000 vacancies, but 26,770 youths 
enrolled.  
10 
 
by participants as a result of their options beyond their participation in the program and 
non-observable characteristics (such as motivation). As it will be seen later on, other 
innovations include incorporating measurement instruments for socio-emotional skills 
and long-term outcome measurements.  
 
The design of the evaluation required Projoven to introduce minor modifications in its 
regular operation processes. First, using a computer assisted program, Projoven had to 
assign a random number to each individual who applied to the program. For each 
course,
14
 PPTAs had to determine suitable candidates for admission among the total 
number of applicants who had selected each specific training course. Unlike previous 
processes, PPTAs were not allowed to determine which candidates would fill a vacancy 
in a particular course, since the final selection of program´s beneficiaries was performed 
by random assignment by Projoven in coordination with the evaluation team. In courses 
with excess of demand (meaning those with more suitable candidates than vacancies), 
candidates were sorted according to their random number (see Diagram 1). The first on 
the list would obtain a slot in the course and would make up the treatment group; the rest 
would make up the control group.
15
 If a specific course had less suitable candidates than 
available vacancies, all applicants would be placed in the course. Only applicants from 
courses with excess of demand would be included in the final sample of the study.  
 
Second, Projoven had to assign a unique identification code to each applicant, and this 
number had to be the same in all of the program’s processes the youths had to go through. 
Third, in each course with an excess of demand, PPTAs had to assess and preselect at 
least 25% additional suitable applicants with respect to the number of available 
vacancies. This extra 25% of suitable applicants over available vacancies would be used 
to generate the control group. Fourth, in case of drop-outs during the first week of classes 
in courses with excess demand, PPTAs were not able to freely select their replacements. 
Instead replacements had to be selected according to the initial random order. Finally, 
youths from the control group could not re-register for the program’s next call for 
applications.  
 
The evaluation began in early 2009, when Projoven launched its 16
th
 public call for 
applications, and interested youths began to apply. A total of 26,770 individuals applied, 
of whom 23,666 (88%) were declared eligible using the proxy means test. Of these, 
almost 15,000 selected a course.
16
 Nevertheless, around 3,500 young people who selected 
a course abandoned the program before the evaluation stage at the PPTAs. Among the 
eligible individuals who selected a course, 11,713 were assessed by PPTAs. Of this total, 
7,464 (64%) registered in courses with excess of demand in their first choice of course. 
                                                          
14
 In fact, when we say “courses” we refer to the course and a specific section, since some courses at some 
PPTAs were offered in different sections. 
15
 Both, the number of youths that select a specific course and the number of available vacancies for the 
courses, vary between courses and PPTAs. Therefore, the individual probability of being selected as a 
beneficiary is not the same for all youths, and one must consider not only the random allocation but also a 
record of the course and PPTA selected.  
16
 There is no information that makes it possible to analyze the reasons for which the rest of the youths did not 
select a course, or what happened with them.  
11 
 
Of these, 7,151 (96%) were declared suitable applicants by PPTAs, and therefore the 
random sorting was applied to them. Thus, for their first course choice, 5,791 individuals 
were randomly assigned to fill a vacancy and formed the treatment group, while 1360 
individuals were randomly assigned to be part of the control group. 
 
In practice, the evaluation design was not implemented exactly as planned. PPTAs faced 
problems and delays in reaching the additional 25% of youths with respect to the number 
of available vacancies per course. This led Projoven to eliminate this condition after a 
few weeks,
17
 and it’s why not all PPTAs sent an additional list with 25% more suitable 
applicants. This also explains why the control group is smaller than originally planned in 
the evaluation design. Likewise, the program did not use a unique identification code for 
participants in all its operational processes, which makes the evaluation analysis harder.  
 
Moreover, as it often happens with experimental evaluations of public policies, there was 
an imperfect compliance of the experimental design. This happened in part because 
Projoven allowed participants to make a second or third course selection. Thus, 
applicants deemed unsuitable, or those who did not obtain a vacancy for their first course 
choice were able to make a second and even a third course selection. As a result, some of 
the youths from the control group were able to obtain a vacancy in a different course. 
Consequently, for those applicants whose first chosen course had an excess of demand, 
the effective allocation to courses does not strictly correspond to the random assignment 
to treatment and control groups under the established protocol. An analysis of the 
program’s administrative data shows that certain youths from the control group made a 
second and/or third course selection, obtaining a vacancy in some cases. The option for a 
second or third course selection for applicants who did not obtain a vacancy in their first 
selection is the result of self-selection that reflects their motivation, desire or need to 
participate in the training. Additionally, not all youths who started the training made it to 
the on-site internship stage. In this way, the group of youths who received complete 
training differs from the randomly assigned treatment group. This is also the result of 
self-selection. 
 
Table 1 presents the absolute numbers and percentage structure of the experimental 
treatment and control groups over both stages of the program. It shows that since the 
beginning of the training courses, there were discrepancies between the random 
assignment to treatment and control groups and the effective allocation of youths to 
training courses. During the first few weeks, 1% of youths assigned to the treatment 
group abandoned the program and did not begin the training stage at a PPTA. At the same 
time, 39% of youths assigned to the control group began the course stage at a PPTA 
because they had the chance to make a second or third course selection. Upon reviewing 
the situation at the end of the training stage at PPTAs, it was found that 83% of youths 
assigned to the treatment group and 32% of youths assigned to the control group 
completed this stage. If the situation is analyzed at the end of the internship stage, then 
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 In particular, due to operational pressures in the development of enrollment, accreditation and evaluation 
processes, the additional percentage was reduced to 10%.  
12 
 
only 52% of youths assigned to the treatment group also completed the internship stage 
and thus completed the program. For the control group this percentage is 22%. 
 
2. Period of Evaluation 
 
The evaluation period goes from early 2009 to mid-2013. This period comprises the 
longest period of high economic growth achieved by Peru between 2002 and 2013, with 
the exception of the year 2009, when the economy was affected by the international 
financial crisis and only grew 0.9%. The average growth rate during the 2002-2013 
period was 6.1%. With the economic expansion came an increase in employment rates, 
particularly of formal employment.  
 
Figure 1 makes it possible to conduct a more detailed analysis of the evolution of GDP 
and formal employment during the period 2008-2014. Registered employment in the 
Electronic Payroll was used as an indicator of formal employment. As we will explain 
later, registered employment is the economy’s most formal employment. The first finding 
is that registered employment is highly sensitive to the business cycle: its growth rate was 
almost insignificant in 2009, the year in which the economic bust took place, and it 
increased again when the economy recovered. The second finding is that, beginning in 
2012, Peru’s GDP growth rate saw a steady decline, followed by a slowdown in 
registered employment levels and by 2013, registered employment increased only 4% its 
lowest growth rate besides the one observed in 2009.  
 
 
3. Evaluation Data  
 
The evaluation sample is comprised of 7,151 youths that were assigned to treatment and 
control groups in training courses with an excess of demand (on their first course choice).  
 
The final sample used in the evaluation is comprised of 2,924 youths from eight major 
cities in Peru and who have baseline and follow up data. The data comes from three 
sources of information, which are described next.  
 
The baseline data 
 
Baseline data were collected in early 2009, during the process of enrollment of 
applicants. All applicants were required to fill a personal and socio-economic form, used 
by the program to determine eligibility. This information was complemented with data 
retrieved from an additional questionnaire attached to the socio-economic form in order 
to obtain more detailed information on household demographics, recent labor force 
participation history prior to the enrollment in the program, and a measure of self-esteem 
based on the Rosenberg scale.  
 
Therefore, compared to previous evaluations of the program, this baseline has two main 
advantages. First, information is collected on all youths enrolled in the program, not only 
13 
 
on youths from the evaluation sample. Second, the information collected is the same for 
all enrolled youths and was collected during the same period of time.  
 
The follow-up data 
 
A follow-up survey was targeted to a sample of 4,509 youths selected from the evaluation 
sample. This sub sample is comprised of youths from all courses with an excess of 
demand at eight major cities in the country: Lima (the capital city), Ica, Arequipa, 
Huancayo, Chiclayo, Trujillo, Piura, and Cusco.  
 
The collection of data was conducted between November 2012 and March 2013.
18
 Thus 
the information available corresponds to three years after graduation from Projoven. In 
total 2,924 youths were interviewed; this represents 65% of the survey sample. Of these 
youths, 2,378 belonged to the treatment group and 546 to the control group. There are 
two main reasons for which the rest of the target youths could not be reached: i) they had 
moved (close to 50%), and ii) the address included in Projoven’s records was incorrect 
(27%). 
 
MTPE’s administrative records: the Electronic Payroll 
 
Administrative records from the MTPE are also used for the evaluation and come from 
the Electronic Payroll. This is an electronic document that formal employers with more 
than two workers are required to submit through the National Superintendence of 
Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT). Formal employers are required to declare 
their payroll workers, pensioners, service providers (including trainees covered by 
vocational training agreements), third-party staff, and beneficiaries.
19
 Registered 
employment represents the most formal employment in the Peruvian economy, since 
employers who report to the Electronic Payroll comply with all labor benefits and 
entitlements established by Peruvian labor laws. 
 
Access to information from the Electronic Payroll is restricted, and was accessed with 
express authorization from MTPE, with the goal of identifying the impact of Projoven in 
formal employment indicators. To be able to use data on registered employment and 
income, the information from Projoven’s records was matched with the information from 
the Electronic Payroll through the (unique) number of the Peruvian National Identity 
Document (NID).  
 
                                                          
18
 Interviews were performed face-to-face. The questionnaire includes modules on employment and labor 
earnings designed to retrieve information on outcomes such as employment, access to health insurance and 
retirement pension, employment contracts, hours worked, and earnings. The questionnaire includes a 
module on socio-emotional skills that comprise the Rosenberg scale of self-esteem and the Duckworth 
scales of perseverance and ambition. It also includes a module designed to explore beneficiaries’ 
perceptions about the program.  
19 The Electronic Payroll has been implemented in Peru since 2008.  
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All the information extracted from the Electronic Payroll was processed by MTPE’s 
Statistics Department, maintaining data confidentiality. From a total of 7,151 youths in 
the evaluation sample, 6,583 (92%) reported their NID during the enrollment process and 
were available from Projoven’s records.20 Only these youths were searchable in the 
Electronic Payroll records that cover the period from January 2009 to June 2013. Of 
them, 3,590 (55%) appeared at least once in these records.  
 
The two key indicators from the Electronic Payroll that are used for the evaluation are: 
registered employment and income. The income variable is expressed discretely and 
refers to earnings above or below the legal minimum wage level of 2010.  
 
Outcomes constructed using information from the follow-up survey based on self-reports 
on employment and earnings are complemented with outcomes constructed using 
information on formal employment and labor income from the Electronic Payroll. These 
data are available for almost all youth who completed the follow up survey (2914 out of 
2924). 
 
Attrition 
 
Attrition of the sample is high. About 35% of the follow-up survey sample was not 
contacted. To determine if such attrition has a systematic relationship with the random 
allocation of youths to treatment and control groups
21
, the following regression is 
estimated:  
 
𝐴𝑖 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑍𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃2𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖, 
 
where i refers to the applicant; j refers to the training course in the first choice of courses; 
Ai is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the applicant does not have follow-up 
information and value of 0 otherwise; Zi is a dummy variable that represents the result of 
the random assignment and takes a value of 1 for the treatment group and a value of 0 for 
the control group; Cij represents fixed effects for each of the courses for which there was 
an excess of demand, and 𝜀𝑖 represents the error term.  
 
Table 2 presents the results of the estimates. There is no evidence that attrition is related 
to allocation to treatment or control groups. This happens both for the whole sample and 
when it is separated by gender, age groups, or in areas such as Lima and other urban areas 
(OUA). In none of these allocations is the coefficient related to the random allocation 
significant in a statistical sense. 
 
                                                          
20
 This may be related to the fact that the minimum age for enrollment in Projoven was 16, and that until 
recently, Peruvians obtained their NID only at 18 years of age. Currently, the NID is mandatory for all 
newborns.  
21
 Equivalence between attritors in the treatment and control group was also tested. There is no evidence 
suggesting systematic differences among the observables characteristics of attritors related to the program 
assignment. Table A4 in the appendix presents these results. 
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Balance of characteristics in the baseline 
 
Table 3 shows the analysis of statistical equivalence between youths from the treatment 
and control groups available at baseline, which comes from the information included in 
the socio-economic questionnaire used during the accreditation process. The comparison 
is done through the following regression: 
 
𝑋𝑖 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑍𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿2𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖, 
 
where Xi is the baseline variable; Zi is the result of the random assignment and takes a  
value of 1 for the treatment group and a value of 0 for the control group; Cij represents 
fixed effects for each of the courses with excess of demand, and 𝜀𝑖 represents an error 
term. The difference in means for the treatment and control groups is obtained when 
estimating the coefficient 𝛿1.  
 
This analysis is performed for two groups. First, it is performed for the complete sample 
of youths (7,151 youths in the baseline). This allows to verify that the random allocation 
of treatment and control groups makes it possible to balance the characteristics of youths 
in both groups. The same analysis is performed for the sample of youths who responded 
to the follow-up survey (2,924 youths with follow-up data). This makes it possible to 
verify whether baseline characteristics remained balanced between the treatment and 
control groups in the sample for which there was outcome information available after 
graduation from the program.  
 
The characteristics observed in the baseline are balanced between the treatment and 
control groups, with the exception of having completed a technical course, being a 
homeowner, and having water services inside the household. None of the three samples 
show systematic differences in the characteristics of these youths, such as their gender, 
age, and years of basic schooling. There are also no differences in the head of the 
household’s, gender or education level, nor in the characteristics of the household, such 
as material on floors, walls, or ceilings, nor in phone lines. Also, the qualification score 
variable assigned by Projoven does not show any differences between youths in the 
treatment and control groups.  
 
The baseline also includes a questionnaire containing, among other variables, 
Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale and work history prior to the candidate’s participation in 
the 16
th
 call for applications.
22
 Table 3 shows that there are no systematic differences in 
the self-esteem scale.
23
  
                                                          
22
 The question for the self-esteem scale presents 15% of cases with incomplete information preventing the 
calculation of the specific score for youths who did not answer the question. Therefore, a variable was 
generated that indicates whether the participant does not have self-esteem information and thus has been 
assigned the average value observed. The variable has been standardized with respect to average values for 
the control group. 
23
 A similar analysis was performed for work histories before participation in Projoven, and no significant 
differences are observed. 
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These results suggest that the original random allocation into treatment and control 
groups makes it possible to balance the characteristics between the two groups. On the 
other hand, this exercise also makes it possible to observe that there was a similar number 
of men and women in the program, and that its targeting worked relatively well. On 
average, beneficiaries of Projoven came from households with scarce economic 
resources. Also, on average they were only 19 years old and had secondary studies 
(complete or incomplete).  
 
 
4. Methodology for Impact Evaluation 
 
To estimate the effects of Projoven, we use the random assignment of youths into 
treatment and control groups at the time they made their first course selection. The 
intention-to-treat (ITT) effect is estimated by running the following regression: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑍𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 
 
where Yi is an outcome variable; Zi is an indicator of the random assignment result and 
takes a value of 1 for the treatment group and a value of 0 for the control group; Cij 
represents fixed effects for each of the courses for which an excess of demand was 
generated; Xik represents characteristics observed in the baseline, included in order to 
increase the accuracy of the estimations, and 𝜀𝑖 represents the error term. The ITT effect 
reflects the difference in the outcome indicator between treatment and control groups, and 
is obtained by estimating the coefficient 𝛽.24 Standard errors were clustered at the course 
level. 
 
Outcome indicators 
 
The follow-up survey makes it possible to analyze several outcome indicators aggregated 
in four groups: (A) labor market insertion and quality of employment (is employed, has 
health insurance, pension, salaried employment, contract, weekly hours worked); (B) 
income (per month and per hour, expressed in logarithms); (C) income conditional to 
remunerated income (per month and per hour, expressed in logarithms); and (D) socio-
emotional measures (Rosenberg’s scale of self-esteem, and Duckworth’s scales of 
perseverance and ambition).
25
  
 
The Electronic Payroll is used to complement the information obtained in the follow-up 
survey. The first indicator is registered employment, and refers to a job that complies 
with all requirements for formal employment, which is registered and declared by all 
formal employers. This indicator is of a discrete type and is assigned a value of 1 when 
there is verification that the youth had a registered employment in the Electronic Payroll, 
                                                          
24
 The Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) was also calculated. The results are presented in the Appendix.  
25
 Socio-emotional indicators were standardized with respect to the mean and standard deviation of the control 
group. 
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and is assigned a value of 0 in other cases. This indicator is calculated for every month in 
the period of analysis, but it is also possible to calculate it in an aggregate manner by 
year. For instance, it is possible to determine if the participant had a registered job in any 
month during 2011, 2012, or 2013. In this case, the indicator is assigned a value of 1 
when the applicant had a registered job at least once during any month of a given year, 
and a value of 0 when they did not have a registered job during the whole year. 
Alternatively, from the binary indicator it is possible to determine the number of months 
the applicant was at a registered job for each of the years for which there is information 
available. 
 
The second is an income indicator that for confidentiality reasons was obtained as a 
discrete variable. To generate the indicator, groups of one twentieth of the distribution of 
income in the Electronic Payroll for 2010 were used. Twenties from that year were used 
to define 20 groups based on income for each year for which there was information 
available in the Electronic Payroll. For 2010, each group accounts for 5% of registered 
employment in the Electronic Payroll for that year. For the remaining years, each group 
represents a higher or lower percentage, according to how income levels reported in the 
Electronic Payroll evolved. To simplify the analysis, a binary-type indicator is defined 
based on these 20 groups, and is assigned a value of 1 when the income group is higher 
than S/.550, amount that corresponds to the legal minimum wage until November 2010; 
otherwise it is set to 0. As for the registered employment indicator, it is possible to 
determine if the applicant had an income higher than S/.550 during any month for a year 
when information is available, as well as the number of months during which their 
income was above this amount for each of those years. 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of registered employment and income indicators calculated 
from the Electronic Payroll based on the initial random allocation (Panel A), and also the 
formal employment indicators calculated from the follow-up survey (panel B).  
 
Panel A shows very similar trends during the first months of 2009, suggesting that the 
random allocation was able to balance registered employment and income indicators. 
Additionally, a similar, increasing trend in registered employment and income is 
observed between the randomly allocated treatment and control groups during the period 
from 2010 to 2013, and corresponding to the period after the training. Only towards the 
end of the period with available information, between January and June 2013, is there an 
observable advantage in registered employment levels in favor of the treatment group 
versus the control group, although this is not true for the registered income indicator.  On 
the other hand, Panel B shows a growing evolution in the indicators of formal 
employment (health insurance and access to a pension) with a clear advantage for the 
treatment group.  
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IV. Analysis of the Impacts of Projoven 
 
Table 4 presents the results of ITT estimates.
26
 The second column of the table shows the 
results for the total sample of youths who were interviewed for the follow-up survey. The 
following columns respectively show results for only those youths who are women, men, 
those between 14 and 18 years of age, those between 19 and 26 years of age, youths 
residing in Lima, and youths residing in other cities.  
 
We do not observe a statistically significant impact of Projoven on employment but rather 
on the quality of employment (formal employment). Some degree of heterogeneity is also 
observed, since the impact on quality of employment is only maintained for youths who 
are men and for youths who are younger. Therefore, the program would have increased 
the chances for these applicants to obtain access to a formal job inside a context 
characterized by high youth informality. These results are consistent with short-term 
impacts found in evaluations of similar programs in the region (González, Ripani, and 
Rosas, 2012). 
 
Specifically, the probability of having a job with health insurance and the probability of 
having a pension increase in 3.8 and 3.3 percentage points, respectively, for the treatment 
group when compared to the control group.
27
 The percentage of youths in the control 
group who reported having a job with health insurance (15.6%) and those who reported 
having a job with a pension (15.0%) are relatively low. By taking this into account, then 
the effects are of considerable magnitude, since they represent an increase greater than 
20% in the probability of having health insurance or a pension for the treatment group. 
The magnitude of these effects is almost twice for male youths and those between 14 and 
18 years of age.  
 
There are no significant effects on employment or in labor income indicators (panel C) 
and conditional labor income for having a remunerated job (panel D). None of the 
estimated coefficients are significant in statistical terms, although all estimated values are 
positive. These results differ from findings from previous non-experimental evaluations 
of Projoven, in which there were incremental effects of very large magnitude in terms of 
the employment and labor income of beneficiaries.  
 
There are no significant impacts neither on the socio-emotional indicators (panel E). Both 
for the case of Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale and for Duckworth’s perseverance and 
ambition scales, values estimated for the ITT effect are positive, but none of them are 
statistically significant. This result is not surprising, since in strict terms, the program did 
not offer a socio-emotional skills module. 
 
                                                          
26
 The LATE was also estimated. These estimates are included in the Appendix of this document. As expected, 
the main results are maintained and what varies is their magnitude.  
27
 An alternative measure of formality was also tested which consists on aggregating the three formal 
employment indicators (having health insurance, retirement pension and contract). The overall positive 
impact on formality remains significant. 
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Supplementary analysis with outcomes from the Electronic Payroll 
 
Information collected from the Electronic Payroll makes it possible to supplement the 
indicators obtained from the follow-up survey with indicators of registered employment 
and income, which reflect employment with a higher degree of formality in the Peruvian 
economy. Also, since such information is based on administrative data, potential 
measurement errors that could have affected the follow-up survey are corrected.  
 
As shown in Table 5, the impact of Projoven in formal employment is positive and 
statistically significant. Although when compared to the estimates based on the follow-up 
survey, effects of lesser magnitude are observed, since the effect is 17%. This difference 
may be explained by the fact that the Electronic Payroll captures the more formal 
employment of the economy.  
 
The impact of the program is only evident in the year 2013. This result is consistent with 
the results shown in Figure 2. For instance, beneficiaries have 0.22 more months in 2013 
in registered jobs than those from the control group, which is equivalent to a 19% effect. 
This result may be related to a growing trend of the program’s effect over time, and/or a 
decrease of registered employment during that same year, as Figure 1 indicates.  
 
On the other hand, there are different results to those emerging when the effects are 
estimated with the follow-up survey. First, in this case, a statistically positive effect on 
the number of months with income higher than S/.550 for the year 2011 and for the whole 
period between January 2011 and June 2013 is observed,
28
 although with a statistical 
significance of only 10%. The estimated effect suggests that youths from the treatment 
group had 0.31 additional months of employment with income above S/.550 when 
compared to the control group during the year 2011. This represents an increase of 18% 
with regard to the control group. 
 
Second, even though there also was heterogeneity in the results based on the gender and 
age of beneficiaries, there are statistically significant effects for women and youths over 
18. In the case of women and youths older than 18, there is a statistically significant 
effect on registered employment of 26% and 35%, respectively. A significant impact of 
10% may also be observed for beneficiaries residing in Lima, amounting to 20%.  
 
Differences in the results of estimates with different samples may be related to several 
factors. First, the differences in magnitude of the effect of the program on labor formality 
may be explained by the different nature of the information captured in the follow-up 
survey and the Electronic Payroll. Specifically, the first one captures the views of youths 
on formality, and the second captures the formality declared by firms themselves. It may 
be that some youths think of themselves as formal workers because they work at formal 
firms, but these companies do not register them as formal workers and thus do not declare 
them in their Electronic Payroll.  
                                                          
28
 For the year 2013, there only is information available from January to June. 
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Second, these differences may be linked to problems in sample size. The fact that the sign 
and magnitude of the impact are similar in estimates from the follow-up survey and 
Electronic Payroll, but not in statistical significance, leads one to suppose that this may 
be one of the explanations.  
 
Third, for the case of youths under 18, the differences may be explained by the fact that 
formal firms in Peru prefer not to hire (or register) under-aged youths. For the case of 
women, the differences could be related to differences in the preferences and 
opportunities of youths in the labor market according to their gender.
29
 An occupation 
analysis of these youths based on data from the follow-up survey suggests that there are 
disparities between women and men. For instance, there are more women who work as 
employees (50%) than men (42%). Furthermore, the occupation second highest in 
demand by women is sales (19%), while for men it is laborer (30%). Last, the percentage 
of women without a job is more than twice that of men (44% versus 21%, respectively).  
 
Finally, the differences may also be explained due to attrition problems which would 
affect the sample in the Electronic Payroll, since estimates were performed without taking 
into account youths without a NID. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Projoven was implemented in Peru between 1996 and 2010. The program stood out as the 
main public policy for supporting the insertion of the country’s underprivileged urban 
youths into the formal labor market, and because it was the public program that has had 
the greatest number of impact evaluations, though they were all made before 2006.  
 
This new evaluation of the program is really innovative for several reasons. It is 
Projoven’s first experimental impact evaluation, and also the first to measure its impact 
over a longer period: almost three years. Additionally, it is the first evaluation to 
supplement data from a follow-up survey with information from the country’s Electronic 
Payroll, allowing for a more accurate measure of the program’s effect in terms of 
employment formality. Lastly, the evaluation is also innovative because it introduces 
measurements of socio-emotional skills.  
 
In general terms, the results of this evaluation differ from those obtained from previous 
cuasi-experimental evaluations of Projoven, but are aligned with the results of 
experimental evaluations of similar programs in other countries of the region. 
Specifically, it may be said that the program increased the opportunities of finding a 
formal job, in a context of high labor informality.  
                                                          
29
 In order to verify consistency of the results, we carried out two additional exercises. First, we estimated ITT 
using registered employment and income for the sample resulting from combining Projoven’s baseline with 
the Electronic Payroll through the NID. Second, we reestimated the ITT for these same outcomes using the 
sample targeted for the follow-up survey in eight mayor cities (not only the sample who responded to the 
survey). In both cases, we found similar results to those reported in the document. 
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The results in formality levels are noteworthy for the magnitude of the impacts as much 
as the fact that they were observed three years after beneficiaries completed the program. 
They are especially noteworthy given that the goal was to achieve short-term labor 
market insertion with a slightly intensive intervention (technical course and internships in 
firms, for a total maximum duration of six months).  
 
Differentiated results are also obtained according to gender, age and place of residence of 
youths. Statistically significant impacts are observed on (self-reported) employment 
formality and income for men and the youngest. Statistically significant impacts are also 
observed on registered employment and income only for women and youths older than 18 
years. These differences may be explained by various factors, for example: limitations in 
terms of sample size. They may also be related to the specific characteristics of the local 
labor markets in Peruvian cities, and to preferences and/or opportunities young job 
seekers have depending on their gender. In any case, it is a matter that needs to be studied 
in more depth.   
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Diagram 1: Selection Process of Eligible Individuals and Beneficiaries of 
 Projoven 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Economic Growth and Registered Employment Rates 
between 2008 and 2014 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Data on economic growth comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of Peru. Data on registered employment 
comes from the Electronic Payroll records of the Ministry of Labor and Job Promotion (MTPE). 
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Figure 2: Evolution of Registered Employment Indicators in the Electronic Payroll 
(Panel A) and Formal Employment Indicators in the follow up survey (Panel B) 
 
 
 
Note: The figure was generated with Electronic Payroll data for the sample of youths who possessed a NID (92% of the 
total sample) and youth in the follow-up survey.  
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Table 1: Evaluation sample over the training stages 
 
  Treatment group   Control group   Total 
  N Percentage   N Percentage   N Percentage 
Total 5,791 100 
 
1,360 100 
 
7,151 100 
         Began course stage at a PPTA 
      Yes 5,741 99 
 
526 39 
 
6,267 88 
No 50 1 
 
834 61 
 
884 12 
         Completed course stage at a PPTA 
      Yes 4,820 83 
 
435 32 
 
5,255 73 
No 971 17 
 
925 68 
 
1,896 27 
         Completed on-site internship stage 
      Si 3,028 52 
 
298 22 
 
3,326 47 
No 2,763 48   1,062 78   3,825 53 
 
Note: Generated from Projoven's records. 
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Table 2: Sample attrition and random allocation to treatment and control groups 
 
 
Control group  Treatment/control 
  
 
level 
difference N R2 
  (std.err.)     
All 0.370 -0.027 4,509 0.096 
  
(0.020) 
  
Women 0.365 -0.035 2,583 0.11 
  
(0.026) 
  
Men 0.377 -0.026 1,926 0.174 
  
(0.033) 
  
14 -18 years old 0.339 -0.014 1,982 0.168 
  
(0.030) 
  
19 - 26 years old 0.393 -0.033 2,527 0.121 
  
(0.027) 
  
Lima 0.306 -0.033 1,695 0.055 
  
(0.029) 
  
Other cities 0.421 -0.023 2,814 0.099 
    (0.027)     
Note: The table reports the results of the attrition regression for different samples and groups. The dependent variable is 
assigned value 1 when the observation does not have follow-up information. The second column reports the estimated 
coefficient for the variable of random allocation to the treatment group. The regression is controlled with fixed effects from the 
course-section. Standard errors have been estimated using clusters per course.  
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.005; *** p<0.01. The statistical significance is: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Equivalence between the treatment and control groups 
 
  Full sample    Sample with follow-up data 
  
N 
Control 
group 
mean 
Treatment/
control 
difference 
(std. err.) 
   N 
Control 
group 
mean 
Treatment/c
ontrol 
difference 
(std. err.) 
Gender: Male 7,151 0.47 -0.005 
 
 2,924 0.40 -0.004 
 
  
(0.013) 
 
 
  
(0.021) 
Age  7,151 19.22 -0.067 
 
 2,924 19.13 0.021 
 
  
(0.071) 
 
 
  
(0.115) 
Years of schooling 7,151 10.48 0.016 
 
 2,924 10.56 0.023 
 
  
(0.038) 
 
 
  
(0.058) 
Took courses at an institute or university 7,146 0.02 0.008  
 2,923 0.03 0.011 
 
  
(0.005) 
 
 
  
(0.009) 
Took a technical/trade course 7,146 0.13 0.018* 
 
 2,923 0.16 0.000 
 
  
(0.011) 
 
 
  
(0.018) 
Gender of head of the household: Male 7,146 0.64 0.010 
 
 2,923 0.63 0.003 
 
  
(0.015) 
 
 
  
(0.024) 
Schooling of head of the household: 
    
 
   
Complete higher education 7,151 0.34 -0.001 
 
 2,924 0.34 -0.005 
 
  
(0.015) 
 
 
  
(0.024) 
Incomplete higher education 7,151 0.19 0.003 
 
 2,924 0.20 0.022 
 
  
(0.012) 
 
 
  
(0.020) 
Complete secondary education 7,151 0.39 -0.001 
 
 2,924 0.37 -0.005 
 
  
(0.015) 
 
 
  
(0.024) 
Incomplete secondary education 7,151 0.04 -0.002 
 
 2,924 0.04 -0.004 
 
  
(0.006) 
 
 
  
(0.010) 
Elementary/ illiterate 7,151 0.05 -0.001 
 
 2,924 0.05 -0.008 
 
  
(0.006) 
 
 
  
(0.010) 
Overcrowding (people per room) 7,146 3.04 -0.016 
 
 2,923 3.26 -0.023 
 
  
(0.053) 
 
 
  
(0.088) 
Housing: Proprietorship 7,146 0.69 -0.046*** 
 
 2,923 0.78 -0.051** 
 
  
(0.014) 
 
 
  
(0.022) 
Floor material: Floor tile, cement, wood 7,151 0.48 -0.008 
 
 2,924 0.49 0.015 
 
  
(0.014) 
 
 
  
(0.023) 
Ceiling material: Concrete, cement, tiles 7,151 0.47 -0.004 
 
 2,924 0.59 -0.021 
 
  
(0.014) 
 
 
  
(0.024) 
Wall material: Brick 7,151 0.50 0.014 
 
 2,924 0.58 0.032 
 
  
(0.014) 
 
 
  
(0.023) 
Water: Inside the household 7,151 0.81 -0.010  
 2,924 0.82 -0.037* 
 
  
(0.012) 
 
 
  
(0.019) 
Sanitary facilities: Inside the household 7,151 0.70 0.019  
 2,924 0.75 0.008 
 
  
(0.014) 
 
 
  
(0.021) 
Phone numbers: None 7,151 0.90 0.006 
 
 2,924 0.90 -0.015 
 
  
(0.009) 
 
 
  
(0.015) 
Total accreditation score 7,146 14.34 0.057 
 
 2,923 13.73 -0.033 
 
  
(0.132) 
 
 
  
(0.208) 
Self-esteem (Rosenberg) 7,151 0.00 -0.002 
 
 2,924 0.05 -0.017 
 
  
(0.028) 
 
 
  
(0.045) 
No data on self-esteem 7,151 0.13 0.012  
 2,924 0.16 0.007 
      (0.011)        (0.018) 
 
Note: The information corresponds to the baseline. The complete sample corresponds to youths enrolled in a course and 
section with excess of demand for their first course selection. The experimental treatment group corresponds to suitable 
youths who obtained a random vacancy, the control group corresponds to those who did not obtain a random vacancy. 
The difference between the treatment and control groups is obtained from a regression that includes fixed effects per 
course-section. 
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Table 4: Intention to treat effects on outcomes from follow-up survey 
  Sub-groups 
 All Women Men 14-18 19-26 Lima OUA 
 A. Employment indicators         
Employed  0.016 0.015 0.033 0.040 0.013 -0.010 0.030 
  (0.025) (0.034) (0.038) (0.042) (0.036) (0.033) (0.037) 
  0.641 0.552 0.773 0.624 0.655 0.657 0.626 
Wage employment  0.036 0.033 0.036 0.067 0.026 0.007 0.053 
  (0.026) (0.033) (0.048) (0.045) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) 
  0.500 0.433 0.600 0.472 0.524 0.534 0.468 
Hours per week  1.084 0.886 1.998 2.614 0.880 0.354 1.254 
  (1.358) (1.814) (2.396) (2.203) (2.108) (1.973) (1.931) 
  30.073 24.960 37.650 27.804 31.990 31.444 28.752 
B. Formality indicators         
Health insurance  0.038** 0.030 0.069* 0.068** 0.023 0.046 0.025 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.038) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.022) 
  0.156 0.141 0.177 0.140 0.169 0.213 0.101 
Contract  0.028 0.002 0.076* 0.042 0.019 0.024 0.020 
  (0.020) (0.023) (0.041) (0.031) (0.030) (0.036) (0.022) 
  0.178 0.163 0.200 0.156 0.196 0.265 0.094 
Retirement pension  0.033* 0.029 0.054 0.045 0.028 0.046 0.012 
  (0.018) (0.021) (0.039) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.022) 
  0.150 0.129 0.182 0.140 0.159 0.205 0.097 
C. Income        
Monthly, logarithm  0.134 0.128 0.214 0.285 0.132 -0.130 0.301 
  (0.158) (0.204) (0.274) (0.279) (0.227) (0.215) (0.229) 
  4,054 3,372 5,064 3,935 4,154 4,268 3,847 
Per hour, logarithm  0.031 0,025 0.059 0.044 0.043 -0.061 0.094 
  (0.043) (0.050) (0.085) (0.079) (0.057) (0.056) (0.065) 
  0,946 0,769 1,209 0,945 0,947 1,027 0,868 
D. Income, only earned income        
Monthly, logarithm  0.031 0.079 0.000 -0.010 0.062 -0.025 0.073 
  (0.038) (0.065) (0.052) (0.070) (0.051) (0.056) (0.054) 
  6,414 6,244 6,591 6,385 6,436 6,572 6,252 
Per hour, logarithm  -0.017 0.004 -0.025 -0.044 0.013 -0.102 0.054 
  (0.042) (0.067) (0.071) (0.074) (0.057) (0.055) (0.065) 
  1,208 1,101 1,320 1,250 1,174 1,339 1,076 
E. Socio-emotional indicators     
Self-esteem (Rosenberg)  0.038 0.037 0.028 0.015 -0.002 0.042 0.011 
  (0.051) (0.068) (0.094) (0.091) (0.070) (0.073) (0.069) 
  -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 0,042 -0,039 -0,074 0,068 
Perseverance (Duckworth)  0.032 -0.023 0.042 -0.048 0.071 0.066 -0.034 
  (0.053) (0.067) (0.101) (0.085) (0.075) (0.089) (0.063) 
  -0,005 0,052 -0,088 -0,002 -0,007 0,039 -0,047 
Ambition (Duckworth)  0.009 -0.003 0.043 -0.004 0.002 -0.043 0.056 
 (0.049) (0.068) (0.090) (0.078) (0.074) (0.074) (0.069) 
 -0,001 0,025 -0,037 -0,039 0,032 0,164 -0,160 
Notes: The sample corresponds to individuals who completed the follow-up survey. Outcome variables are extracted from the information obtained in this 
survey. All estimations include fixed effects per course. Each estimation controls by gender, age, education, household characteristics, employment trends 
and income. The standard errors were estimated using clusters per course. 
 Statistical significance: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Intention to treat effects on outcomes from the Electronic Payroll  
 
 Sub-groups 
 
All Women Men 14-18 19-26 Lima OUA 
A. Had a job registered in the Electronic Payroll      
Any month in 2011 0.013 0.009 0.018 0.027 0.013 0.039 -0.012 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.049) (0.039) (0.033) (0.043) (0.030) 
 0.337 0.313 0.373 0.296 0.372 0.412 0.264 
Any month in 2012 0.024 0.027 0.059 0.028 0.046 0.054 -0.008 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.045) (0.038) (0.034) (0.034) (0.029) 
 0.315 0.279 0.368 0.316 0.314 0.360 0.272 
Any month in 2013 0.045* 0.061** 0.051 0.026 0.088*** 0.065* 0.025 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.042) (0.041) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) 
 0.269 0.232 0.323 0.291 0.250 0.318 0.221 
Any month from 2011 to 2013 0.016 0.034 0.015 0.013 0.037 0.014 0.015 
 (0.026) (0.033) (0.047) (0.042) (0.033) (0.042) (0.032) 
 0.455 0.409 0.523 0.453 0.456 0.551 0.362 
Months in 2011 0.308 0.387* 0.348 0.358 0.334 0.526 0.062 
 (0.202) (0.231) (0.400) (0.303) (0.284) (0.364) (0.225) 
 2.168 1.969 2.459 1.806 2.470 2.704 1.649 
Months in 2012 0.258 0.370* 0.316 0.201 0.471 0.373 0.082 
 (0.197) (0.224) (0.400) (0.334) (0.294) (0.315) (0.241) 
 2.269 1.978 2.695 2.263 2.274 2.730 1.822 
Months in 2013 0.221** 0.349*** 0.201 0.239 0.355** 0.328* 0.123 
 (0.111) (0.130) (0.200) (0.190) (0.150) (0.181) (0.133) 
 1.171 1.015 1.400 1.202 1.145 1.431 0.920 
Months from 2011 to 2013 0.786* 1.107** 0.865 0.798 1.161* 1.227* 0.267 
 (0.435) (0.466) (0.879) (0.696) (0.615) (0.707) (0.533) 
 5.608 4.963 6.555 5.271 5.889 6.865 4.391 
B. Income higher than S/.550      
Any month in 2011 0.025 0.031 0.026 0.025 0.037 0.063 -0.015 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.047) (0.037) (0.033) (0.039) (0.029) 
 0.285 0.257 0.327 0.255 0.311 0.345 0.228 
Any month in 2012 0.024 0.035 0.044 0.020 0.052 0.070** -0.020 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.044) (0.039) (0.033) (0.035) (0.029) 
 0.293 0.251 0.355 0.300 0.287 0.326 0.261 
Any month in 2013 0.036 0.043 0.049 0.020 0.073** 0.057 0.015 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.041) (0.042) (0.029) (0.036) (0.029) 
 0.239 0.204 0.291 0.259 0.223 0.292 0.188 
Any month from 2011 to 2013 0.017 0.035 0.013 -0.002 0.053 0.039 -0.008 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.045) (0.041) (0.033) (0.037) (0.033) 
 0.413 0.365 0.482 0.421 0.405 0.487 0.341 
Months in 2011 0.319* 0.420** 0.260 0.284 0.369 0.592* 0.024 
 (0.183) (0.207) (0.379) (0.274) (0.263) (0.340) (0.194) 
 1.766 1.573 2.050 1.457 2.024 2.213 1.333 
Months in 2012 0.191 0.265 0.224 0.168 0.353 0.352 -0.015 
 (0.186) (0.219) (0.380) (0.306) (0.281) (0.287) (0.235) 
 2.007 1.743 2.395 1.919 2.081 2.423 1.605 
Months in 2013 0.131 0.219* 0.101 0.157 0.243 0.256 0.023 
 (0.109) (0.127) (0.195) (0.185) (0.149) (0.177) (0.130) 
 1.057 0.907 1.277 1.065 1.051 1.307 0.815 
Months from 2011 to 2013 0.641 0.904** 0.585 0.608 0.964 1.200* 0.031 
 (0.406) (0.439) (0.833) (0.634) (0.581) (0.654) (0.499) 
 4.831 4.223 5.723 4.441 5.155 5.944 3.754 
 
Notes: The sample corresponds to individuals who completed the follow-up survey, and who had a NID. Outcome 
indicators are generated with the information obtained from the Electronic Payroll.. All estimations include fixed effects 
per course. Each estimation controls by gender, age, education, household characteristics, employment trends and income. 
Standard errors have been estimated using clusters per course. The standard error was calculated using clusters for each 
course. The statistical significance is: * p<0.l, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.  
 
34 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Estimation of the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) 
The main part of this document estimates the intention-to-treat effect (ITT), adjusting the 
following regression: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑍𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 
 
where Yi is the outcome indicator; Zi is the result of the random assignment and takes a value of 1 
for the treatment group and a value of 0 for the control group; Cij represents fixed effects for each 
course with excess demand; Xik represents characteristics observed in the baseline, included to 
increase the accuracy of the estimations, and  represents a term for error. The ITT effect reflects 
the difference in outcome indicators from the treatment and control groups, and is obtained 
estimating coefficient  
Since there is no perfect compliance of random assignment, assignment to treatment and control 
groups differs from the effective allocation of youths to training courses, and in particular to 
completing the training (denoted by Di = 1) or not completing the training ( Di = 0) . Under these 
conditions, it is possible to estimate the effect of the training (the effective allocation) through the 
Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) (see Angrist and Imbens, 1994; Angrist, Imbens, and 
Rubin, 1996; Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer, 2007). 
LATE is obtained using instrumental variables regressions, taking advantage of the exogenous 
variation derived from random allocation for the first course selection as instrumental variable. 
The effect of the local treatment can be written as: 
𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸 =
𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑍𝑖=1]−𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑍𝑖=0]
𝐸[𝐷𝑖|𝑍𝑖=1]−𝐸[𝐷𝑖|𝑍𝑖=0]
 . 
The reduced form, the numerator in the expression above, corresponds to the ITT. The first stage, 
the denominator in the expression above, is a regression in which the dependent variable is the 
effective allocation Di and the explanatory variable is the random allocation, the instrument Zi.  
The first stage regression also includes the courses fixed effects, which allows us to take into 
account that the probability of being assigned to the treatment or control groups differs between 
courses, since the number of applicants varies between different courses. 
Next, we will describe the results of the estimations for the first stage, which allow us to 
transform the ITT effect into the LATE. For the regression of the first stage, the dependent 
variable is the indicator of effective participation in Projoven, in particular having completed the 
on-site internship stage. The key explanatory variable, which is used as instrumental variable for 
LATE estimations, is the outcome indicator for the random allocation to the treatment group 
(Zi = 1) or to the control group (Zi = 0) at the moment of the first course selection. This random 
allocation only took place in courses with an excess of demand. 
Estimations for the first stage include fixed effects per course as covariables, since the random 
allocation to treatment and control groups was done at the course level. On the other hand, the 
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number of participants in each course is different, for which the probability of being assigned to 
the treatment or control group is specific to each course. They also include two groups of 
characteristics observed in the baseline as additional covariables. The first considers the sex, 
schooling, and age of the participant. The second adds household characteristics and the previous 
work history of the individual. Unlike the random allocation variable, these additional 
covariables do not constitute instrumental variables. 
Table Al presents the results of the estimation for the first stage. This estimation was done for the 
complete sample and several sub-groups (according to sex, age, and city/region). For the 
different sub-samples and specifications, we find that the random allocation variable has an 
approximate estimated coefficient of 0.3, calculated in a very precise manner, with a very low 
standard error. This indicates that youths assigned to the treatment group have a probability 30 
points higher of completing the training than youths assigned randomly to the control group. The 
value of this coefficient indicates that the results of the ITT represent a third of the LATE (or, in 
other words, the LATE is three times the ITT effect). 
The table also presents the weak instrument test. This test allows us to contrast if the variable of 
completing the training is sufficiently correlated to the variable of random allocation to treatment 
and control groups that serves as instrument in the estimation of the local treatment effect using 
the instrumental variables method. In all cases, we find that statistics for the weak instrument test 
are higher than critical values calculated by Stock and Yogo (2005). Consequently, it is possible 
to reject the weak instrument hypothesis. 
 
Next, we present the results from LATE estimations, using indicators from the follow-up survey 
and the Electronic Payroll. In general, the results follow the same patterns obtained when 
estimating the ITT, but the magnitudes are higher. 
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Table Al: First stage regression results and weak instrument tests 
 
  Coefficient N R2 Weak instrument 
  (std.err)     test 
    All 0.312*** 2,923 0.504 276.6 
 
(0.019) 
   Women 0.305*** 1,718 0.539 157.0 
 
(0.024) 
   Men 0.327*** 1,205 0.561 102.9 
 
(0.032) 
   14 to 18 years old 0.308*** 1,306 0.55 109.5 
 
(0.029) 
   19 to 26 years old 0.308*** 1,617 0.545 138.7 
 
(0.026) 
   Lima 0.164*** 1,224 0.421 32.8 
 
(0.029) 
   Other cities 0.44*** 1,699 0.532 316.9 
  (0.025)       
Note: The table reports the results of the regression of the first stage for different samples and groups. The dependent variable is 
having completed the training, the instrument is the random allocation, and the regression controls by fixed effects from the course-
section. The last column shows the value of the weak instrument test. Standard errors have been estimated using clusters per course. 
Significance: * p<0.l, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table A2: LATE on outcomes from follow-up survey 
 
 
 Sub-groups 
 
All Women Men 14-18 19-26 Lima OUA 
A. Employment indicators 
       
Employed 0.052 0.049 0.102 0.129 0.041 -0.058 0.067 
 (0.075) (0.103) (0.106) (0.125) (0.106) (0.189) (0.078) 
 0.641 0.552 0.773 0.624 0.655 0.657 0.626 
Wage  employment 0.115 0.108 0.109 0.216 0.084 0.042 0.120 
 (0.079) (0.100) (0.131) (0.134) (0.117) (0.211) (0.079) 
 0.500 0.433 0.600 0.472 0.524 0.534 0.468 
Hours per week 3.479 2.901 6.115 8.477 2.860 2.158 2.852 
 (4.168) (5.543) (6.647) (6.618) (6.305) (11.368) (4.169) 
 30.073 24.960 37.650 27.804 31.990 31.444 28.752 
B. Formality indicators        
Health insurance 0.123** 0.099 0.212** 0.220** 0.074 0.219 0.057 
 (0.057) (0.062) (0.107) (0.088) (0.084) (0.180) (0.048) 
 0.156 0.141 0.177 0.140 0.169 0.213 0.101 
Contract 0.089 0.006 0.233 0.136 0.062 0.149 0.046 
 (0.062) (0.071) (0.118) (0.090) (0.091) (0.210) (0.047) 
 0.178 0.163 0.200 0.156 0.196 0.265 0.094 
Retirement pension 0.105* 0.096 0.166 0.147* 0.090 0.280 0.028 
 (0.056) (0.063) (0.108) (0.085) (0.081) (0.171) (0.047) 
 0.150 0.129 0.182 0.140 0.159 0.205 0.097 
C. Income        
Monthly, logarithm 0.430 0.419 0.654 0.924 0.429 -0.794 0.686 
 (0.481) (0.620) (0.758) (0.830) (0.676) (1.232) (0.491) 
 4.054 3.372 5.064 3.935 4.154 4.268 3.847 
Per hour, logarithm 0.101 0.081 0.180 0.142 0.138 -0.372 0.214 
 (0.132) (0.152) (0.234) (0.234) (0.167) (0.317) (0.138) 
 0.946 0.769 1.209 0.945 0.947 1.027 0.868 
D. Income, only earned income        
Monthly, logarithm 0.094 0.247 0.000 -0.030 0.192 -0.134 0.161 
 (0.108) (0.182) (0.136) (0.181) (0.139) (0.276) (0.110) 
 6.414 6.244 6.591 6.385 6.436 6.572 6.252 
Per hour, logarithm -0.051 0.013 -0.074 -0.136 0.041 -0.552** 0.118 
 (0.121) (0.186) (0.186) (0.193) (0.152) (0.277) (0.131) 
 1.208 1.101 1.320 1.250 1.174 1.339 1.076 
E. Socio-emotional indicators        
Self-esteem (Rosenberg) 0.120 0.122 0.087 0.047 -0.005 0.255 0.026 
 (0.156) (0.210) (0.259) (0.266) (0.208) (0.420) (0.148) 
 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.042 -0.039 -0.074 0.068 
Perseverance (Duckworth) 0.102 -0.075 0.130 -0.156 0.231 0.403 -0.077 
 (0.166) (0.206) (0.283) (0.251) (0.224) (0.539) (0.138) 
 -0.005 0.052 -0.088 -0.002 -0.007 0.039 -0.047 
Ambition (Duckworth) 0.029 -0.011 0.134 -0.012 0.008 -0.261 0.129 
 (0.151) (0.209) (0.248) (0.228) (0.223) (0.435) (0.154) 
 -0.001 0.025 -0.037 -0.039 0.032 0.164 -0.160 
Notes: The sample corresponds to individuals who completed the follow-up survey. Outcome variables are extracted from the 
information obtained in this survey. All estimations include fixed effects per course. Each estimation controls by gender, age, 
education, household characteristics, employment trends and income. The standard errors were estimated using clusters per course. 
Statistical significance: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
38 
 
Table A3: LATE on outcomes from Electronic Payroll 
 
 
 Sub-groups 
 All Women Men 14-18 19-26 Lima OUA 
A. Had a job registered in the Electronic Payroll 
      
Any month in 2011 0.041 0.030 0.056 0.089 0.042 0.236 -0.027 
 (0.077) (0.090) (0.132) (0.116) (0.100) (0.250) (0.066) 
 0,337 0.313 0.373 0.296 0.372 0.412 0.264 
Any month in 2012 0.077 0.090 0.181 0.091 0.150 0.326 -0.017 
 (0.069) (0.085) (0.123) (0.112) (0.102) (0.199) (0.063) 
 0.315 0.279 0.368 0.316 0.314 0.360 0.272 
Any month in 2013 0.143** 0.201** 0.157 0.085 0.286*** 0.396* 0.056 
 (0.071) (0.089) (0.113) (0.122) (0.094) (0.213) (0.064) 
 0.269 0.232 0.323 0.291 0.250 0.318 0.221 
Any month from 2011 to 2013 0.050 0.113 0.046 0.044 0.119 0.088 0.034 
 (0.078) (0.100) (0.129) (0.124) (0.100) (0.237) (0.070) 
 0.455 0.409 0.523 0.453 0.456 0.551 0.362 
Months in 2011 0.989 1.271* 1.063 1.176 1.085 3.200 0.141 
 (0.619) (0.712) (1.076) (0.897) (0.848) (2.168) (0.484) 
 2.168 1.969 2.459 1.806 2.470 2.704 1.649 
Months in 2012 0.828 1.216* 0.965 0.661 1.532* 2.266 0.188 
 (0.609) (0.708) (1.091) (0.985) (0.901) (1.816) (0.521) 
 2.269 1.978 2.695 2.263 2.274 2.730 1.822 
Months in 2013 0.712** 1.146*** 0.614 0.785 1.154** 1.993* 0.280 
 (0.341) (0.420) (0.537) (0.553) (0.467) (1.043) (0.287) 
 1.171 1.015 1.400 1.202 1.145 1.431 0.920 
Months from 2011 to 2013 2.529* 3.633** 2.642 2.622 3.772** 7.460* 0.609 
 (1.338) (1.485) (2.372) (2.040) (1.880) (4.169) (1.148) 
 5.608 4.963 6.555 5.271 5.889 6.865 4.391 
B. Income higher than S/.550 
      
Any month in 2011 0.079 0.101 0.079 0.083 0.120 0.380 -0.033 
 (0.072) (0.087) (0.126) (0.110) (0.099) (0.244) (0.063) 
 0.285 0.257 0.327 0.255 0.311 0.345 0.228 
Any month in 2012 0.079 0.114 0.133 0.067 0.168* 0.428** -0.045 
 (0.070) (0.086) (0.121) (0.116) (0.101) (0.212) (0.063) 
 0.293 0.251 0.355 0.300 0.287 0.326 0.261 
Any month in 2013 0.114* 0.142* 0.150 0.065 0.239*** 0.345* 0.033 
 (0.069) (0.085) (0.110) (0.124) (0.090) (0.208) (0.062) 
 0.239 0.204 0.291 0.259 0.223 0.292 0.188 
Any month from 2011 to 2013 0.053 0.114 0.040 -0.008 0.174* 0.239 -0.018 
 (0.074) (0.099) (0.123) (0.123) (0.100) (0.210) (0.072) 
 0.413 0.365 0.482 0.421 0.405 0.487 0.341 
Months in 2011 1.025* 1.377** 0.795 0.933 1.199 3.601* 0.054 
 (0.564) (0.648) (1.026) (0.814) (0.790) (2.063) (0.418) 
 1.766 1.573 2.050 1.457 2.024 2.213 1.333 
Months in 2012 0.615 0.870 0.686 0.551 1.147 2.137 -0.034 
 (0.575) (0.687) (1.040) (0.909) (0.858) (1.687) (0.506) 
 2.007 1.743 2.395 1.919 2.081 2.423 1.605 
Months in 2013 0.421 0.718* 0.308 0.515 0.789* 1.559 0.051 
 (0.334) (0.398) (0.529) (0.543) (0.455) (1.006) (0.281) 
 1.057 0.907 1.277 1.065 1.051 1.307 0.815 
Months from 2011 to 2013 2.060 2.965** 1.789 1.999 3.135* 7.297* 0.071 
 (1.255) (1.397) (2.264) (1.872) (1.778) (3.924) (1.077) 
 4.831 4.223 5.723 4.441 5.155 5.944 3.754 
Notes: The sample corresponds to individuals who completed the follow-up survey, and who had a NID. Outcome indicators 
are generated with the information obtained from the Electronic Payroll. All estimations include fixed effects per course. Each 
estimation controls by gender, age, education, household characteristics, employment trends and income. Standard errors have 
been estimated using clusters per course. The standard error was calculated using clusters for each course. The statistical 
significance is: * p<0.l, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table A4: Equivalence between attritors in the treatment and control groups 
 
Dependent Variable: Being Attritor 
Observable 
Characteristic 
Treated 
Interaction 
[Treated/Obs. 
Characteristic] 
N 
Gender: Male 0.0063 0.0276 -0.0383 7151 
  (0.0236) (0.0174) (0.0253)  
Age  -0.0058 -0.06 0.0036 7151 
  (0.0049) (0.1054) (0.0055)  
Years of schooling -0.0017 -0.04 0.0047 7151 
  (0.0083) (0.0993) (0.0094)  
Took courses at an institute or university -0.0152 0.0094 0.0269 7146 
  (0.0758) (0.0129) (0.0821)  
Took a technical/trade course 0.0425 0.0172 -0.0563 7146 
  (0.0342) (0.0136) (0.0376)  
Gender of head of the household: Male 0.0423* 0.0275 -0.0276 7146 
  (0.0235) (0.0210) (0.0262)  
Schooling of head of the household: 
    
Complete higher education 0.0439* 0.0148 -0.0148 7151 
  (0.0239) (0.0156) (0.0265)  
Incomplete higher education 0.0084 0.0088 0.0048 7151 
  (0.0285) (0.0142) (0.0318)  
Complete secondary education -0.0405* 0.0093 0.0011 7151 
  (0.0232) (0.0162) (0.0257)  
Incomplete secondary education -0.0021 0.0086 0.0342 7151 
  (0.0595) (0.0130) (0.0663)  
Elementary/ illiterate -0.0311 0.0086 0.0266 7151 
  (0.0534) (0.0131) (0.0597)  
Overcrowding (people per room) 0.0147** 0.0216 -0.0037 7146 
  (0.0066) (0.0256) (0.0073)  
Housing: Proprietorship 0.135*** 0.0417* -0.0393 7146 
 
(0.0244) (0.0223) (0.0269)  
Floor material: Floor tile, cement, wood -0.058** -0.0105 0.0423* 7151 
  (0.0229) (0.0175) (0.0251)  
Ceiling material: Concrete, cement, tiles 0.0524** 0.0179 -0.0172 7151 
  (0.0232) (0.0173) (0.0252)  
Wall material: Brick 0.0205 0.0034 0.012 7151 
  (0.0230) (0.0179) (0.0251)  
Water: Inside the household 0.08*** 0.0376 -0.0339 7151 
  (0.0290) (0.0286) (0.0318)  
Sanitary facilities: Inside the household 0.0603** -0.0033 0.0168 7151 
  (0.0249) (0.0230) (0.0274)  
Phone numbers: None 0.016 0.0874** -0.0857** 7151 
  (0.0377) (0.0400) (0.0420)  
Total accreditation score 0.0035 0.0604 -0.00348339 7146 
  (0.0025) (0.0409) (0.0027)  
Self-esteem (Rosenberg) 0.01778 0.0097 -0.0082 7151 
  (0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0136)  
No data on self-esteem 0.02 0.0101 -0.0041 7151 
  
(0.0333) (0.0137) (0.0367)  
Notes: The information corresponds to the baseline for all youths enrolled in a course and section with excess of 
demand for their first course selection. The experimental treated group corresponds to suitable youths who 
obtained a random vacancy, the control group corresponds to those who did not obtain a random vacancy. The 
coefficients presented were obtained from a (separate) regression  of a dummy variable for attritors on a dummy 
for the treatment status, an observable characteristic, and the interaction between the two. Fixed effects per 
course-section included. The statistical significance is: * p<0.l, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. 
 
